Can An Opposition Coalition be Successful in Singapore?
Leaders from seven different opposition parties gathered to discuss the possibility of an opposition coalition on 28 July 2018. The meeting was hosted by the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP). (PHOTO: SDP)
On 24 November 2022, Anwar Ibrahim was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, leading a “unity” government comprising various (previously opposing) coalitions. The formation of the unity government seemingly marked the end of three years of political instability post-“Sheraton Move” – in this period, Malaysia was led by three different coalition governments and Prime Ministers!
In contrast to the rife political situation in Malaysia, Singapore’s political scene has been relatively predictable and stable. The People’s Action Party (PAP) is almost always guaranteed a parliamentary super-majority.
However, given the situation in neighbouring Malaysia, the question arises – could an opposition coalition disrupt the established equilibrium in Singapore, just as it did in Malaysia, first with ex-PM Mahathir Mohamad in 2018, and arguably again with Anwar Ibrahim in 2022?
Perhaps the most obvious parallel between both countries is between Mahathir and the leader of the Progress Singapore Party (PSP), Tan Cheng Bock. After all, both opposition figures were formerly politicians from the ruling party who later “defected” to the opposition.
In fact, in 2018, Tan Cheng Bock himself admitted that he was open to the idea of leading an opposition coalition. Hence the question arises – could Tan Cheng Bock, just like Mahathir, serve as a unifying figure for an opposition coalition to unite around?
Expectations vs Reality
The comparison is not so direct, due to the different circumstances in Malaysia and Singapore. On closer examination, there is a contradiction between what an opposition coalition aims to do and what, arguably, is realistic for opposition parties in Singapore to achieve.
In the case of Malaysia, the opposition coalition aimed to amass numbers to form a new government, or at least, to force the incumbent into a two-party government. The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition tapped on established opposition parties such as the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), as well as new parties such as Berstau, to overthrow the Barisan Nasional coalition.
In contrast, in Singapore, only two parties, the Workers’ Party (WP) and the PSP average a vote share of close to or exceeding 40%. Even when combined, the total number of seats they contested in 2020 was 45, which is less than half of the seats in Parliament.
Seen in this context, the short-term goal for the opposition in Singapore should be quality over quantity – for example, concentrating on quality candidates to achieve a two-thirds majority. Yet, at least at face value, a coalition seems to achieve the opposite effect.
In fact, in the 2020 elections, the WP ran on the ticket that it was not trying to deny the PAP a mandate (or its ability to form a government), but rather, in the words of Associate Professor Jamus Lim, “a blank cheque!” This is entirely at odds with the seeming objective of a coalition, at the very least, when compared to Malaysia.
Coalition or Alliance?
Perhaps another case could be made for a less ambitious opposition coalition — an alliance. Such an alliance would include fewer parties (presumably, the more credible ones) and aim to improve the overall credibility of opposition parties in Singapore.
In fact, this case was made by Tan Cheng Bock himself, who in 2018 commented that “Some [opposition leaders] may also need to stand down and serve from the backroom if it is for the good of the country.”
Implicit in this statement was an acknowledgement that certain parties are not credible enough to pose a legitimate threat to the PAP and should thus not even bother contesting. Already, we have seen two opposition party leaders fall afoul of the law. The Secretary-General of People’s Voice, Lim Tean, has been handed multiple charges, including criminal breach of trust. Similarly, the former Chairman of the Reform Party, Charles Yeo, has fled Singapore to seek asylum in the UK, after being charged with wounding the feelings of Christians.
Nevertheless, a critical stumbling block for a credible alliance is the refusal of the WP to be involved. The WP has always been keen to maintain an arm's length from the other opposition parties. In the words of Pritam Singh in 2019, “There's a good reason why we've avoided any invitations from the SDP. [The SDP] had sent us an invitation to discussions for a coalition. They invited Tian Chua from PKR and asked us to come down for a general discussion. I won't touch them with a 10 feet pole."
The Pitfalls of Personality-driven Politics
In contrast to the WP, the PSP and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) have shaped their party brand around personalities. It can be even said that these parties were created or established in the very image of the leaders. Their party identity is hence inextricably tied to individual personalities, such as Tan Cheng Bock and Chee Soon Juan.
However, there are limits to this approach. Yes, a personality-driven approach was successful in Malaysia. Still, there is simply too much of a difference between the popularity of an ex-Prime Minister as compared to a former PAP MP. At best, it can help a party secure one constituency, as seen in Tan Cheng Bock’s 48% vote share in West Coast GRC, when he was up against two ministers.
It is true that the WP, to some extent, has also relied on personality politics. There are a few more prominent personalities in WP, such as Pritam Singh, Low Thia Khiang and Jamus Lim. In fact, one might even argue that Jamus Lim was the pivotal factor that tipped the balance of Sengkang towards WP.
At the same time, the WP has also attempted to cultivate a strong and credible party branding that goes beyond just personalities. This also explains why the WP places critical emphasis on leadership renewal. Even in the absence of former Secretary-General Low Thia Kiang, the WP still achieved its best electoral result in the 2020 elections.
In contrast, as highlighted by astute political observer Derek da Cunha, despite not having won a seat for over 20 years, Chee Soon Juan still has not stepped down as the Secretary-General of the SDP. This goes against norms in many other democracies.
Another key point made by political observers Elvin Ong and Terence Lee is that Singapore’s electoral rules require candidates contesting in GRCs to all come from the same registered party. For a genuine alliance to work, candidates would have to quit their existing parties and join a new “alliance” party. However, given that many parties are personality-driven, this appears unlikely to materialise.
What Is The Way Ahead?
If not personality, then how can opposition parties compete? Should any coalition or alliance aim to instead compete on ideology, and from there, establish a strong identity?
Unfortunately, the answer does not seem so simple. Unlike in other democracies such as the US, where the main parties are ideology-driven, the PAP itself does not have any discernable ideology. If they did have any ideology, it would be pragmatism, which is inherently difficult to oppose.
The PAP’s strength lies in its legitimacy and promise to deliver progress. Unlike in Malaysia, where its leaders have consistently been embroiled in alleged corruption scandals, the PAP arguably has not failed to deliver its promise of progress.
The characterisation of the WP as “PAP-lite” by Vivian Balakrishnan in 2020, while perhaps a little unfair, does somewhat point to the path for opposition success – adopt a moderate stance that does not differ too much from the PAP. Of course, other factors do matter too, such as party credibility and retail politics.
For now, at least, an opposition coalition or alliance does not seem too feasible.
Written by Ng Shang Wen