The Morality of War Crimes and Science - through the lens of J. Robert OPPEnheimer

Note: Explanations for bolded concepts can be found in the glossary at the end of the article.

Oppenheimer has been released for close to one and a half months now, dominating the global box office with a staggering $38.1 million. Christopher Nolan’s blockbuster film is a microscopic character study of the man, the myth and the legend behind the Manhattan Project – J. Robert Oppenheimer. The film presents perennial moral dilemmas surrounding weapons of mass destruction and scientific advancements that remain relevant in the 21st century, amidst the volatility of polarising international conflicts. Oppenheimer’s life, in all its rawness and vulnerability, has been flashed on screens across the world for contemporary society to – in the words of Cillian Murphy himself – “judge (him) as we wish”. This essay thus serves to peer more closely through Nolan’s lens and Oppenheimer’s eyes, adopting both Kantian Duty Ethics and Utilitarianism to reflect firstly, on the morality of dropping the atomic bomb as a war crime,  and secondly, on scientific progress. 

In most moral philosophies, dropping the A-bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be unjustified. The Categorical Imperative in Kantian Duty Ethics states that in order for morals to be upheld, we must act according to the maxim by which one can, and at the same time, will that it should become universal law, and that humans must be viewed as an end themselves. The sheer destruction resulting from the dropping of the A-bomb severely undermined principles of jus in bello, and by that same logic, is completely unjustified under deontological ethics. 

Perhaps it is only under theories of Consequentialism, such as Utilitarianism, that such war crimes may be justified; that is, when one’s utility or happiness is maximised in choosing the right course of action (Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1879). While Act Utilitarianism seeks to achieve the common, greater good by choosing the course of action that maximises benefit, when the decision was made by President Truman to drop the A-bomb, neither Oppenheimer, nor the US government, had the means to accurately determine the gains or losses that would ensue from a war crime of this scale and novelty. In the movie, the “near zero”, but ultimately non-zero, chance of destroying the world, is a horrific revelation of the arbitrary nature of metrics that serve as the bedrock for nuclear weaponry use and war crimes. This ultimately testifies against decision-making agents’ ability to fully take into account the additive consequences of an action. Modal discourse, such as counterfactual reasoning, which is concerned with what is not, but what could or would have been, is central for rational decision-making (Starr, 2019). 

Rule Utilitarianism could not present a more hopeful case for the dropping of the A-bomb either. Rule Utilitarians “judge the morality of individual actions by reference to general moral rules, and the correct moral rules are those rules whose general acceptance would maximise wellbeing” (Nathanson, 2011). Under Rule Utilitarianism, it would be reasonable to propose that we ought not to cause mass destruction, unless it prevents further destruction down the line. However, such a moral rule projects future outcomes that transcend time and space, especially in the context of the A-bomb — a weapon of mass destruction of complete novelty. Hence, by the theory of Rule Utilitarianism, considering counterfactuals beyond preexisting scientific parameters and the limits of human imagination was necessary but challenging. Historical sources indicate that when the decision was made, the military had estimated that half-a-million American casualties, and many more Japanese lives would be saved through the use of the atomic bomb to end the war (Compton, 1946). There was also the highly plausible outcome that other countries would want greater stakes in the nuclear arms race, and America was not about to jeopardise their newly established carte blanche as military superpower and global leader (Rivage-Seul, 1987). However, quantifying more unfamiliar outcomes of counterfactual alternatives, even with algorithms like Bayesian networks or causal decision theories (Weirich, 2020), would have been impossible without a complex degree of imagination or critical consciousness, coined by Freire and Himmelkert to be conscientização and “transcendental imagination” respectively (Freire, 1968; Hinkelammert, 2012). This is especially given the prevalence of many independent variables, including but not limited to the opportunity cost of the $2.2 billion invested in the Manhattan Project alone, 4 years in war, and Truman’s firsthand warfare experience from World War I which undoubtedly impacted his military leadership strategies. Herein lies the limitation of using Utilitarianism to justify the dropping of the bomb. 

Beyond the pivotal historical act of dropping the bomb, the morality of the act of scientific development of the A-bomb in itself has also invited scrutiny. As we delve into Oppenheimer’s stream of consciousness during the film, we are forced to contend with complex emotions compounded by guilt and helplessness, but also selfishness and ambition, as Oppenheimer becomes aware of how his personal passion pursuit is being morphed into a weapon of mass destruction. Based on factual accounts, Oppenheimer was always characterised to be morally conflicted — on one hand, he dissuaded Edward Teller from circulating Szilard’s petition to the government that advised against using the bomb on Japan, without first allowing Japanese surrender. Oppenheimer justified this with his belief that “scientists have no business to meddle in political pressure of that kind” (Teller; Schweber, 2000). On the other hand, especially in later years, he acknowledged the “peculiarly intimate responsibility (of physicists) for suggesting, for supporting, and in the end, in large measure, for achieving the realisation of atomic weapons” (Schweber, 2000). The infamous line in Christopher Nolan’s Oppenheimer from the Bhagavad Gita, “Now I am become Death, Destroyer of Worlds”, though dramatised, accurately encapsulated the religious and moral tensions that plagued Oppenheimer throughout his scientific endeavours, which became more evident in the post-war period. 

If we were to approach Oppenheimer’s moral dilemma of developing the bomb itself, we could use both Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology to analyse the issue. The spirit of scientific pursuit, which in this case involved intense research into quantum mechanics and atomic energy, on its own follows Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Furthermore, moral luck under Kantian deontology dismisses Oppenheimer’s moral culpability over bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on the basis that Oppenheimer had little to no agency over how the bomb would be used. However, we could also argue that the distinct and specialised purpose of the Manhattan Project – to build a functional nuclear weapon for potential use against the Germans (TNA, 1942) – highlights that this scientific pursuit had a crystallised intention. Thus, given that intentionality of action is the basis of agency (Scholsser, 2019), scientific advancement with the intention of developing a nuclear weapon not only fails the categorical imperative, but also renders Kant’s moral luck argument invalid. Hence, this scientific undertaking is immoral from the perspective of Kantian ethics. 

By the theories of Act and Just Utilitarianism, the case presented supporting scientists behind the bomb is much more bleak. Following the Consequentialist train of thought, the evaluation of net pleasure or pain resulting from this scientific endeavour must be extended to the point post-bombing, instead of passing moral judgements solely based on intention as Kantian Duty Ethics would. Severe critics of the building of the bomb adopt non-Kantian perspectives on moral luck, which claims agents can still be correctly assigned blame or praise for the eventual consequences of their actions irregardless of their lack of control (Nelkin, 2019). It can be concluded that the directing of the bomb to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though not within Oppenheimer’s jurisdiction, was still an outcome of his actions, and thus demanded reproof. On the other hand, Utilitarianism also leaves room to explore the pleasurable outcomes of the Manhattan project. I would postulate that instead of imposing a damning indictment of immorality on the scientists at Los Alamos, there is still nuance to be navigated, in that their work offered exciting possibilities for energy markets and civilians. By successfully starting a fission chain reaction in the reactor-pile of Uranium-238 to produce the fissionable material Plutonium-239, Oppenheimer’s team provided the basis of calculation and theory not just for nuclear weapons, but for further development of nuclear energy. Following the Great Depression and World War II from 1929 to 1945, the nuclear energy industry could have provided a beacon of hope for economic recovery for different societies, if peaceful negotiations for international cooperation had been made early on. Massive efforts to explore peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst civilians (US Department of Energy, 1994) preceded the golden age of nuclear energy from the 70s to 90s. Therefore, in weighing out net pleasure and pain, we could find justifications for this scientific endeavour. 

I think it was interesting to note that the film was also an in-depth exploration of Oppenheimer’s guilt. Guilt and psychological burdens borne by the scientists was a central motif throughout Nolan’s film, and we see this portrayed artfully in the victory speech scene, where the overlaying of effects of thumping of feet, shifty eyes, vomiting, suffering and helplessness encapsulated the weight that Oppenheimer had to bear as the man behind the bomb. Granted that an action has been deemed morally right under Utilitarianism, in that it would lead to the greatest amount of pleasure and least amount of pain, could guilt then offset and eliminate controversy surrounding the very fact that innocent lives were sacrificed in a decision? I believe Oppenheimer’s regret could not undermine the immorality of his scientific pursuits, however it could on a more personal level, allow us to better empathise with his moral dilemmas, rather than completely vilifying his character. 

“No scientist, no matter how aware he may be of these fruits of his science, cultivates his work, or refrains from it, because of arguments such as these. No scientist can hope to evaluate what his studies, his researches, his experiments may in the end produce for his fellow men, except in one respect—if they are sound, they will produce knowledge.” These were the words of J. Robert Oppenheimer in one of his many post-war reflections (Schweber, 2000). Science itself is neutral, but the consequentialist perspective always requires us to consider what science is being used for, while Kantian deontology as a moral theory keeps us grounded in how scientific research should be purposed. As we navigate the 21st century that is both fraught with international conflict and marked by the burgeoning of scientific advancement and military technology, it is now even more crucial that we cling on to the moral philosophies that undergird our existence as humans, and safeguard the very depths of our heart and consciousness.  

Written by Isabel Yamada

Special thanks to Austin Ho, Kian Ian, Pei Chong and Shang Wen

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