
Written by: Justin Chia
High-Speed Rail in China:
More than just Economics?
Train lines with operating speeds in excess of 200km/h are widely known as High-Speed Rail (HSR). Though often associated with Japan and its sleek Shinkansen network, China has more recently taken a leading role in the development of HSR. Since the start of Chinese HSR in 2008, it has expanded to become the world’s largest network of HSR, accounting for over two-thirds of the world’s total length of HSR. As with other instances of infrastructure, it seems like the main function of Chinese HSR, like other similar HSRs, is to facilitate economic development. With faster modal transport, larger and larger areas begin to serve as one cohesive economic area, thus catalysing regional development. Yet, Chinese HSR extends into far-flung areas of China that are relatively less economically unviable. As a consequence, it seems like HSR in these areas is misguided, and a political waste of resources. However, I believe that such “wasteful” infrastructure can be explained by another motive of the Chinese government in its frontier Western regions: the policy goal of projecting economic development as opposed to stimulating actual economic development, so as to strengthen national unity. HSR is a more potent means of projecting this development compared to other modes of infrastructure like roads or airports, making it an important and widely-used tool, even where economically less useful.
Before analysing the Chinese HSR network, it is important to know its general configuration. In the figure above, all non-grey lines are some form of HSR line. China’s HSR network is mainly concentrated in the populous Eastern seaboard of China, where most of the population resides. The Chinese HSR also consists of multiple “main lines”, rather than one major North-South line as Japan does. The system is thus more decentralised, with multiple North-South and East-West corridors (e.g. Beijing-Shenzhen, Fujian Coastal Corridor), that covers massive distances across China, becoming the longest HSR network in the world. Chinese HSR is also entirely passenger-based, and operated as a monopoly by the state-owned company China Railway (CR), with consistent and uniform branding nationwide. Interestingly, HSR also branches out of the dense east, with one line branching out into the Northwest (Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia) and another isolated blue-coloured branch in the West (Tibet).
As with other forms of infrastructure, it seems that HSR is a means to pursue economic development. By increasing the ease of transportation, there is the integration of further districts into the wider economic area of cities or towns, encouraging the movement of economic activity like investment and business into these underdeveloped areas. Take for instance the destination pair Shanghai-Nanjing, a route with either a 1 hour 15 minute flight, a similarly-timed train journey, or a 4 hour bus ride. With the hassle of having to travel to airports and handle check-in procedures, it is clear that the more convenient travel medium of trains is preferable to both other options. For a business traveller, this means that business trips to Nanjing from Shanghai are made more convenient. They are willing to commute more to handle business activities like meetings, allowing for greater economic efficiency in terms of planning and the coordination of information. Things like investment projects, for instance, can move with greater speed. Consequently, Nanjing’s economy is further integrated with the Shanghai metropolitan economy, resulting in great investment and stronger more quality jobs for the economy. Xiaomi, the second-largest seller of smartphones worldwide, has established its major R&D centre in the region in Nanjing. This would not least be due to its accessibility to Shanghai, the major metropole in the region. The benefits in convenience also apply themselves to other sectors like tourism. The easier a destination is for tourists to go to, the more likely they will opt to travel there for leisure.
With this primary intention of HSR, it follows that China should concentrate its HSR efforts in high-potential areas, namely regions of high population density. In these areas, HSR presents a viable alternative to modal options like vehicles or airplanes, thereby increasing the accessibility of a location and allowing for more tighter integration within the local economy. Much of HSR development thus far can be viewed in this light. Take the Shanghai-Nanjing route noted earlier. The route connects key regional centres within Jiangsu, like Wuxi and Suzhou, reducing travel times to within 1 hour. Areas around train stations thus effectively serve as part of the same urban region that revolves around Shanghai. The immense population and economic output of these cities heavily encourages regional investment.
For instance, Danyang Spectacle Centre, a hub for the worldwide trade in spectacle frames, was built in 2021 only after the completion of Danyang station on the aforementioned Shanghai-Nanjing line, to take advantage of the new convenience it affords. With HSR, developers are thus keen to develop these suddenly valuable tracts of land, with access to the second-largest metropolitan area in China.
However, the pattern of development of HSR in the sparsely-populated Western regions of China is not explained by this primary motive for HSR. In Gansu, Xinjiang and other Western provinces, HSR is simply an uneconomical enterprise. Take the Lanzhou-Xinjiang HSR line as an example.
It carries 1/8 the average passenger load of the average Chinese HSR line, and serves about 15 million people, 4 times less than the 60 million served by the Shanghai-Nanjing HSR, in a distance that is five times its length. Each unit of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang HSR thus roughly serves about 5% of the population of an equivalent distance for the Shanghai-Nanjing HSR. All this speaks to the comparatively underused nature of this line. A low service pattern is also compounded by the fact that this HSR is a very poor alternative to other mediums of transport. The two major cities connected by the route, Lanzhou and Urumqi, take 12 hours to travel between by HSR, compared to 3 hours by airplane. Beyond Xining, Lanzhou, and Urumqi, no city on the line surpasses 1 million in population. With the route passing through the arid hills of Gansu and Xinjiang, and the Taklamakan Desert, the landscape is harsh, as the image below shows. Development in this terrain would be uneconomical and more costly, further stunting the possible economic development the HSR could potentially contribute to.
Evidently, the railway as a whole is not the most economically viable, and the investment spent could have been economically better used. Businesses in the region would not be incentivised to invest in development around stations on the network; most of the stations are not close or accessible enough to integrate themselves in the local economy. Taking the major cities on the network as Urumqi, Xining, and Lanzhou, more than ⅓ of the network lies more than 2 hours away, even with HSR. At such a distance, investment into these regions becomes less economically viable due to the sheer distance and time needed to accommodate travel between these destinations.
While Western Chinese HSR lines are, like the Lanzhou-Xinjiang line, mostly uneconomical, they cannot be blamed on a lack of government foresight or error. Instead, I believe that such economically unviable HSR lines are instead symbolic of how China uses HSR: that the political gain from legitimacy and national unity built by HSR far surpasses the immense cost of such projects. The case for HSR would be bolstered by the fact that it is a more potent political symbol than other forms of infrastructure like airports or new highways, thereby explaining the Chinese government’s emphasis on HSR.
Firstly, as with most forms of infrastructure, Chinese HSR achieves political legitimacy by promoting equitable economic growth for poorer citizens in Western regions, thereby allowing the government to deliver on its message of growth for all. China claims that it has spent more than 320 billion RMB/43.6 billion USD on railway lines in the three Western provinces covered by the Lanzhou-Xinjiang line. The money spent would doubtlessly go towards hiring workers in the region and providing them with relatively high-wage jobs in construction. This development would also persist with the continued hiring of workers in the region for maintenance and operation. For those living in more rural areas distant from major cities, there would also be the provision of new (albeit economically unviable) transportation options.
Political legitimacy also depends on the perception of growth or development by beneficiaries. This perception is independent of actual economic growth and depends more on, dare I say, feelings. For instance, although subsidies on key goods like gasoline might not lead to a very large increase in net income, households are often very much appeased by such “vote-buying” measures. In terms of such perception, HSR is a very potent means to achieve this political goal. There are multiple reasons for this which I attempt to address: firstly, as a world-leading technology, Chinese HSR is likely to bring a strong perception of “rejuvenation” and development. Secondly, the technical complexity of the construction of the line itself serves as a signal of the government’s commitment. Lastly, HSR is also likely a stronger tool compared to other forms of infrastructure in terms of fostering legitimacy since it is the most directly intertwined with the state.
Chinese HSR is a strong symbol of legitimacy chiefly because of its world-leading nature. Their train services hold various records, like the longest HSR service in the world (Beijing-Kunming, 2,760km), the fastest HSR service (Beijing-Shanghai, 291.9 km/h on average), and the highest passenger utilisation amongst HSRs worldwide. Current HSR technologies in China rely completely on indigenous technologies and manufacturing. All trains are currently manufactured by state-owned company CRRC. Research is also conducted and furthered by CRRC and government alike.
As the photo alludes to, there exists a very strong narrative that HSR is a technology China and its citizens should be proud of. The banner above notes that HSR is one of the means in which China can achieve the “rejuvenation” of its people. To bring such a system into the Western regions thus symbolises the equitable sharing of such technology regardless of economic status. In spite of the relatively poor status of these provinces, there seems to be the message that as part of China, they should share in the fruits of technology, and are inalienably part of China and its wider progress.
Another facet of political legitimacy comes from the technical complexity of such an undertaking. The Lanzhou-Xinjiang line for instance passes through harsh terrain in China’s Northwest, like extreme winds and temperatures in the Northwestern deserts, and the towering Qilian Mountain Range. Much of the concrete the tracks are placed on has thus cracked or deformed in these harsh conditions. Beyond the engineering feats required of the railway, there are other complexities involved, for instance in the procedures like maintenance required to continuously operate and maintain upkeep of the lines. The disproportionate investment into such a relatively underperforming line can thus be seen as somewhat gestural in nature. The mere act of being able to construct and operate such a HSR well in a challenging environment is a display of competence and ability to the local populace, thereby bolstering legitimacy.
Having explained two forms of legitimacy the HSR might bring, I also want to further elaborate why HSR is a more potent form of political messaging compared to other infrastructure projects, like highways or airports. This is so because HSR, as an infrastructure and transport medium, is the most intertwined with the state. The Chinese state directly provides HSR, and is also the main orchestrator of the entire HSR project. This makes it clear to passengers and beneficiaries that the economic good of transportation is created by the government rather than other parties. The message of economic growth is thus directly tied to the state. The Chinese HSR firstly makes the connection between itself and the state clear. It is operated solely by China Railways, an entirely state-owned enterprise. Branding for trains and stations is uniform throughout the network to create a uniform brand identity. In contrast, services like aeroplanes rely on private firms with their own branding to provision the service of flights; the government in this case merely serves as a supervisor/regulator. The seamless merger of state and railway is also evident in the overt political slogans in train stations, and even the names of the trains themselves. Of the two kinds of rolling stock available on China’s HSR, one is named “Harmony/和谐号” and the other “Rejuvenation/复兴号”. Both were named after political slogans and ideals. Consumers and citizens tie the idea of the railway with the state, and acknowledge that the state is the main driving force behind the improvements in transportation outcomes. The figures below show the consistency of this CR branding.
Having shown that HSR is perhaps the most legitimacy-bolstering form of transport infrastructure, there exists a clearer motive for why China wants to build economically-unviable HSRs, especially in the Western regions. This occurs because the Chinese state recognises the importance of bolstering its political authority in the West, which as frontier regions are long considered as more restive due to economic and demographic factors. Take for instance Xinjiang. It is a far more multi-ethnic province compared to the rest of China, which is Han-dominated. In terms of ethnic makeup, the province is 45% Uyghur, 5.96% Kazakh, and only 42% Han. Both Uyghur and Kazakhs are Central Asian peoples with different cultures from the predominantly Han China. Religious differences also exist; Uyghurs and Kazakhs tend to follow Islam as compared to Han’s tendency to follow Chinese folk religion. Economic disparities also exist between Western inland provinces and China’s wealthy coastal provinces. Gansu (Lanzhou’s province) has a GDP per capita which is 54% of the national average, while Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong (all coastal) have these numbers at 168%, 140% and 120% respectively. Xinjiang’s stands at 83%, though after much investment by the state in the last few years. Such socio-economic characteristics make the Western regions far more vulnerable to political instability, and the central government is thus understandably keen to curb this. HSR thus stands as one facet of this project for political stability.
Conclusion
I hope that this argument has shown how Chinese infrastructural decisions are often complex, and combined with calculations about the effect of their decisions beyond just economic growth for its citizens. The development of Chinese HSR in the West is thus no mere miscalculation but part of a systematic ploy to garner local political support to build sorely-needed political unity. In this process, the state considers a myriad of factors like geography, technology, and political symbolism. What seemingly is a project to prove China’s leading edge in technology is also a part of its political aims for national unity.
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